ARISTOTLE’S ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ

Amanpulo, Palawan, Philippines

It is difficult indeed to make conclusions if one does not have a clear basis from which to conclude, just like in the case of the epistemology of Aristotle or how Aristotle understood episteme. There have been a lot of interpretations regarding this matter. The Greek philosopher did not leave any particular work that deals especially with this, as C.C.W.  Taylor confirmed: “In contrast with Plato, none of Aristotle’s major works has its central topic the nature of knowledge in general.”[1] In Posterior Analytics we may find some discussions about this topic of knowledge, but here Aristotle drew a number of distinctions and the liberal use of terms that spur debates until the present day.

I.             ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ: A SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE?

Caramoan, Camarines Sur, Philippines

What is ἐπιστήμη to Aristotle? Among the modern commentators of Aristotle, many understand it as “scientific knowledge” while others, like Burnyeat, consider it as some special cognitive state or “understanding” as opposed to a simple knowledge.  What is the difference between “scientific knowledge” and “understanding” then? The Greek term ἐπιστήμη which Aristotle himself was analyzing, according to Burnyeat, can refer either to the cognitive state of the knowing person or to a body of knowledge or  a science- a system of propositions which can be learned and known.[2] Many Aristotelian commentators, like Taylor, translate this term as “scientific knowledge.” Scientific knowledge is a knowledge accumulated by systematic study and organized by general principles. It is usually attained by demonstration. Biology, for example, is a scientific knowledge or science about the living things especially with reference to their origin, growth, reproduction, structure, and behavior. It may answer questions like: Why do horses sleep standing up? The acquisition of knowledge in this discipline is through experiments and demonstrations. It does not explain though why they have life, which is the common principle among living matters. Burnyeat, however, refuted the traditional English translation of Aristotelian episteme as “scientific knowledge”. According to him, the results this produces can be ambiguous and puzzling.[3] And we will know why. And he also emphasizes that there is no Greek word or term that corresponds to the modern term “scientific”. By scientific we mean “systematic or accurate in manner”.  For his part, Taylor refuses to translate the Greek terms sophia and nous as ‘wisdom’ and ‘intelligence’ respectively because, according to him, this would be uninformative, or even worse, misleading. But he does not hesitate to translate episteme as scientific knowledge. Burnyeat, as we know, questions this translation.

Unmnamed islet, Cebu, Philippines

Burnyeat argues that “Aristotle first advances a quite general thesis about a cognitive state” which the Greek thinker himself calls ἐπἰστασϑαι, that “in its unqualified version this involves knowing the cause or explanation of something and knowing its necessity”, and that from this “one can have ἐπιστήμη of is that which cannot be otherwise.”[4] Burnyeat distinguishes ἐπἰστασϑαι from ἐπιστήμη. Burnyeat speaks of two phases or modes of the cognitive state which are distinct but complementary.  This will help to clarify the issue. Burnyeat, moreover, assures that Aristotle gives the main characteristic of the cognitive state: “it centrally involves the possession of apodeictic proof or demonstration.”[5] By apodeictic we mean that is unquestionably or necessarily true. It means that the cognitive state possesses what is necessarily true. 

Bellaroca, Marinduque, Philippines

He criticizes G.R.G. Mure’s translation (“the premises of demonstrated knowledge”) for he believes that a cognitive state cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises. He says that “these attributes belong to knowledge in the other sense of what is known,” and he further clarifies, “to the propositions making up the body of science.”[6] We may understand Burnyeat’s argument in this simple logic: If we suppose that ἐπἰστασϑαι is a cognitive state, but a cognitive state cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises, therefore the ἐπἰστασϑαι cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises. In other words, if we accept this thesis of Burnyeat (“A cognitive state cannot be said to be demonstrated, nor does it have premises”), therefore the cognitive state denotes a knowledge that is evident, necessary, and universal. Burnyeat’s argument, we believe, is very much in line with Aristotle’s idea that there is no distinction between what one perceives and what is being perceived. The ἐπἰστασϑαι could consequently  mean the act of knowing itself or the sensory experience that gives us direct and immediate knowledge of the objects while episteme is a kind of special cognitive state.

Dimakya, Palawan, Philippines

What is evident and necessary does not need any demonstration because a demonstration is given in order to clarify things. By demonstration we mean an act or circumstance of proving or being proved conclusively as by reasoning or a show of evidence. What is evident is clear in itself and does not need any instrument to represent, to explain, or to prove itself. We say that scientific knowledge is acquired through demonstration since we need proofs or even empirical experiments like in the case of experimental sciences. Scientific knowledge then does not delve on what is evident but tries to impart information through proofs or demonstrations. Through this, we may understand why Burnyeat says that demonstration and premises belong to a body of science. We have that common knowledge, for example, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. This knowledge is evident. It does not need any demonstration. It becomes a scientific knowledge when we try to explain why this phenomenon happens or occurs. For this we have a scientific knowledge or a science about the heavenly objects, the astronomy. He continues explaining, “The things which are true, primary, etc. are indeed expressed as the premises of demonstration, but the dependence in question here is the epistemological relation of the cognitive state to its grounds, not the logical relation of conclusion to premises.” [7] What he means here is that what is true or necessary is evidence or proof in itself. Therefore, the thesis of Taylor: “There is no episteme of the principles of knowledge” is correct or true if episteme here refers to scientific knowledge.  

Hundred Islands, Pangasinan, Philippines

Aristotle opines: “All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.”[8] If knowledge is demonstrative then the premises prior to it are known than it. It means that the premises are themselves primary, immediate, and prior to. Burnyeat, thus, asserts: “Demonstrative ἐπιστήμη depends on things which are true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion.”[9] We are quite sure then that Aristotle’s “pre-existent” knowledge does not mean scientific knowledge. That “pre-existent” knowledge of Aristotle could not be demonstrated. If it could be demonstrated, then there is another “pre-existent” knowledge prior to it, and so on and so forth. We will end up in a vicious cycle. Thus, if all knowledge is demonstrative, then there is no knowledge per se. If all knowledge needs proof or evidence, then that proof or evidence is some kind of possession of knowledge or, we say, a “prior” knowledge. We do agree with Burnyeat’s conclusion: “Because ἐπιστήμη involves grasping the demonstration of necessary conclusions, it is grounded epistemologically on the premises of that demonstration.”[10] We, therefore, assert that not all knowledge is demonstrative.

Sunken Cemetery, Camiguin, Philippines

Taylor, on the other hand, asserts that episteme is a demonstrative state. By this he means that a human being knows when he believes something and the principles or the premises are known or presented to him. Citing the Nicomachean Ethics, he states that “what is grasped by episteme is what is demonstrated, and since there have to be first principles of demonstration, there is no episteme of the principles of knowledge.[11] To prove that there is no knowledge or episteme of the principles of knowledge, Taylor explains  that the principles of demonstration cannot be themselves demonstrated  because if ever there is this possibility, then the principles of demonstration must be known and must be known other than by demonstration. The inconsistency of Taylor is this: if we acquire episteme by demonstration, then we must know beforehand the premises or principles of that demonstration. If we say that knowledge is acquired through reasoning, then there must be a demonstration, but the premises themselves are conclusions of the demonstration. Therefore not all knowledge is demonstrative. We can conclude then that not all episteme is scientific. 

Tawi-Tawi, Philippines

Moreover, Taylor identifies episteme as one of the theoretical cognitive states together with the sophia. He states that theoretical knowledge is restricted to knowledge of the universal necessary truths, but later says that demonstrative knowledge (episteme) is restricted to what we can explain. But universal necessary truths do not need any explanation. What is universal and necessary is proof in itself. In the other part, he says that “… episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous are described as ‘those in which we possess the truth and are never mistaken.”[12]  It is indeed true that there can be no error in knowledge of what is evident. The knowledge of what is evident can never commit any error, since the evidence is the truth itself. Errors or mistakes could occur in the demonstration. So it would be a mistake to translate episteme as scientific knowledge if this latter denotes explanation or show of evidence. Scientific knowledge, though tries to be systematic and accurate, is still prone to error or mistake. Biology, Chemistry, and other sciences do not necessarily impart truth.  The principles of these sciences are justified through results of experiments which are prone to mistake or error, therefore, changeable and contingent.

Bucas Grande, Surigao del Sur, Philippines

In the other part of his work, Taylor states this: “Aristotle contrasts episteme properly so called (i.e. scientific knowledge) with perceptual episteme.”[13] But he insists that only ‘explanatory’ knowledge ( i.e. scientific knowledge ) of a phenomenon, that is, knowing in the full sense why that phenomenon occurs, is worthy to be called episteme, or in his own words, “dignified by the term episteme”[14] He admits that explanatory knowledge presupposes a prior knowledge, “knowledge that it occurs.” He believes, however, that this kind of knowledge is incomplete. Its completion comes only when one has an explanation of the phenomenon. To qualify this acquisition as knowledge, one must know the explanation of this phenomenon. For him, only when we come to understand through explanation that we can have a complete knowledge that is worthy to be called episteme. Taylor, however, forgets that this kind of knowledge is “perfect” in itself since it is indubitable and certain. It is a knowledge of what is evident and true.

We oppose Taylor’s thesis- ‘explanatory’ knowledge (scientific knowledge) is the ‘true’ knowledge- because this knowledge could not be knowledge at all since it is prone to error or mistake. In order to be a true knowledge, it must be assured of foregone conclusion, which the scientific knowledge may not have. We believe that knowledge consists in knowing being or truth since it is impossible to know what is not.

II.          ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ AS UNDERSTANDING

Boracay, Aklan, Philippines

If ἐπιστήμηis not scientific knowledge, what does Aristotle mean of it? Can we simply call it “knowledge”? Burnyeat believes that for Aristotle, episteme is not knowledge as understood in philosophy. What is episteme then? He thinks that Aristotle’s episteme is best understood as “understanding.” One could understand a thing or fact if that thing or fact is explained. For example, it is a common knowledge that it is day when the sun appears, and it is night when the sun disappears and darkness reigns. Even a young child knows this, but when this phenomenon is explained to him, he may acquire a “deeper” knowledge, not just a “mere” or “immediate” knowledge. Since there is no exact term that could capture or embody this kind of knowledge in English language, Burnyeat prefers to use the term ‘understanding’. 

Coron, Palawan, Philippines

What would be the consequences if we translate episteme as understanding, not as scientific knowledge? Knowledge is generally understood today as justified true belief.  According to Burnyeat, “justification is expressed in argument to show that a proposition is true.”[15] He further adds that the argument needs not to be deductive. If ever it is deductive, he continues, it is not even a requirement for Aristotle in order to explain from first principles why the proposition is true.[16] This means that the demonstration from the first principles is not a requirement of justification but of scientific explanation. From this, Burnyeat deduces that “explanation and understanding go together in a way that explanation and knowledge do not.”[17] According to him, he does not want to provoke controversy with this remark. But with a deeper analysis of his argument, this is somewhat true. There is no need to explain a fact if the other knows it, but there is a need to explain so that that other could understand. John Barnes translates a part of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics this way: “We think we understand a thing simpliciter ( and not in the sophistic fashion incidentally) whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise.”[18] Understanding, therefore, depends on explanation (not the way Taylor understands it). What we receive and gain from knowledge is understanding. Using the analogy of teaching, Burnyeat clearly explains, “Teaching in the sense of imparting knowledge to people who did not have it before must normally include citing of evidence and justification.”[19] Citing evidence and justification denotes explanation. He adds, “But teaching may also be designed to impart understanding of knowledge which the pupils already have, or a deeper understanding of a science which they already have some acquaintance with but in an unsystematic way.”[20] Episteme, then, as understanding denotes a possession of knowledge or grasping the demonstration of necessary conclusions.

III.       CONCLUSION

Miniloc, Palawan, Philippines

The issue about the notion of ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle remains to be open for debate. There are different translations and interpretations of Aristotle’s texts. We beg to disagree, however, with the translation of episteme as scientific knowledge or simply as knowledge. If episteme indicates the end or completion of the epistemological process, as Burnyeat concludes,[21] then it could not be scientific knowledge. Moreover, it is absurd to say “one knows what he knows”, rather we say “one understands what he knows”. The term ἐπιστήμη then could not be simply called “knowledge”. If episteme denotes achievement or possession of its end (knowledge), the term ‘understanding’ would be the appropriate word in English as equivalent to Aristotle’s ἐπιστήμη. Since there is no knowledge about knowledge, what we could have is the understanding of that knowledge, that is, having or possessing a “deeper” knowledge. We do agree, then, with Burnyeat that Aristotle´s ἐπιστήμη means “understanding”.

Aristotle

                                            

---

[1] C.C.W. Taylor, Aristotle’s Epistemology, p.116

[2] M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, p.97

[3] Op. cit.

[4] Op. cit. p.98

[5] Op.  cit.

[6] Op. cit. p.99

[7] Op. cit. p. 99

[8] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.1

[9] Op. cit.

[10] Burnyeat, p. 99

[11] C.C.W. Taylor, Aristotle’s Epistemology, p.119

[12] Op. cit., p.118

[13] Op. Cit., p.118

[14] Taylor, p.122

[15] Burnyeat, p. 101

[16] Op. cit.

[17] Op. cit. p. 102

[18] Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1975.

[19] Burnyeat, p. 117

[20] Op. cit., pp. 117, 118

[21] Op. cit., p.133