THE NATURAL SELECTION AND ADAPTATION THEORY: Can We Consider a Speculative Theory as Truth?

Philippine Eagle

The cornerstone of the Theory of Evolution of Charles Darwin is the natural selection. This idea within the Evolution theory was an adaptation of the “survival of the fittest” theory of Thomas Robert Malthus in his famous work An Essay on the Principle of Population. The natural selection is defined as the process in which from one generation to the next, the struggle for resources (Darwin called this as “struggle for existence”) will favor individual creatures with some variations over others and thereby change the frequency of traits within the population. Moreover, the traits that confer an advantage to those individuals who leave more offspring are called adaptations.[1] It rests on complex suppositions. Some theorize that individual organisms adapted to their environment and this equipped them with certain features for survival and reproduction, citing for example the case of the giraffes on how they develop long necks. However, some opine that the natural selection does not try to supply what an organism “needs”, for example, that a snake would eventually develop wings to avoid its predators. It means that the organisms do not constantly have a progressive development. They deny that the natural selection produces “perfection” to the organisms. They speculate instead that the natural selection is the simple result of variation, differential reproduction, and heredity. For them, it is a mindless, goalless, and mechanistic process.  

Philippine Tarsiers

But for Charles Darwin, the formation of the new species is the result of the natural selection through which favorable variations or the well-adapted organisms would tend to preserve, while those unfavorable ones would be destroyed or doomed to extinction. The natural selection is the theory that accounts for the divergence of species from common ancestors and thus for the endless diversity of life. This means that as individual organism adapt to their environment, each organism separately or independently change itself, creating new species. If this true then there should be different innumerable species. The evolutionists will surely retort that this will not happen in a lifetime but in a span of million years. Let us take as an example that of the dinosaurs. They appeared and roamed on earth approximately 230 years ago, and became the dominant terrestrial animals for 135 million years. They became extinct 65 million years ago. The extinction may not be a result of adaptation and natural selection since they were the undisputed predators. The widely accepted theory presupposes that all dinosaurs became extinct as a result of a meteor crash on earth. But according to the Wikipedia, the birds survived the extinction event that occurred 65 million years ago, and that these birds continue the dinosaur lineage to the present day. If this true, then there is no evolution in this case, but devolution. How do the gigantic, fierce dinosaurs “evolve” into the birds we know today? 

Philippine Spotted Deer

On the other hand, Ayala opines that the natural selection increases the frequency of the genotypes that have better biological efficacy and that efficacy and adaptation must frequently go together because if it is the other way life on earth would have been extinct a long time ago. According to this theory, furthermore, in order for natural selection to operate on a trait, the trait must possess heritable variation and must confer an advantage in the competition for resources.  If one of these requirements does not occur, then the trait does not experience natural selection.  If this is the case then the birds we have today could not be results of an evolution of the ancient dinosaurs for it would mean the loss of that superior biological efficacy.

Butanding

Here are some of the other limitations of natural selection.[2] The first is the lack of necessary genetic variation. It means that the natural selection can only operate on the genetic material already present in a population of organisms. It cannot create new genetic information and subsequently change one kind of organism into another.[3] The second limitation according to the article Understanding Evolution is the constraints due to history. It explains that the basic body form of mammals is already laid out in their genes and development in such a mutually constrained way that is unlikely to be altered. The third limitation is the trade- offs according to which changing one feature for the better might change another for the worse. The example of this is that longer legs would mean greater speed but it could be hazardously delicate, that is, easily breakable.

Philippine Civet

Just like in the Theory of Evolution in its totality, there are varied and even contradictory opinions. Moreover, there are a lot of inconsistencies in them. Many theories oppose each other and refute the validity of each other. But the different theories on Evolution collectively agree on the thesis that life is a ramification from a common ancestor through gradual genetic changes for million years. But one question that the Evolution theory could not satisfactorily answer is how do human beings develop their rationality, their capacity of decision-making, their culture, etc. Is the rational nature of man a result of the adaptation and natural selection? Will snails, worms, or even planktons have a rational nature million years from now? Will they be developed into rational beings? The answers to these questions here will just be based on mere speculations.

Philippine Tamaraw

If natural selection produces changes in the genetic composition of a population from one generation to the next, then organisms become better adapted to their environment, does it mean that there will be constant and endless change of species? If human beings have the same ancestors with the apes, does it mean that the monkeys and apes that we have today come from ancient primates that failed to evolve? But evolution means to have superior biological efficacy. Failure to evolve means extinction. How come there still exist animals of lower forms? Do their ancestors failed to evolve, and how come they continue to exist? This theory could never unlock the mystery of life. Though valuable in science, a theory that remains on the level of speculation should never be considered as truth.

Charles Darwin

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[1] Evolution and Natural Selection @ www.globalchange.umich.edu.

[2] www.evolution.berkeley.edu.

[3] www.icr.org/natural-selection/

LA ÉTICA DE BARUCH SPINOZA: DEL PODER DEL ENTENDIMIENTO O DE LA LIBERTAD HUMANA

Lake Balinsasayaw, Negros Oriental, Philippines

Spinoza afirma que para vivir según la razón es vivir en libertad, y no vivir en la servidumbre  o esclavitud a las emociones. Si actuamos de acuerdo a la razón, entonces nos dejamos guiar por el amor y buena voluntad, y no por el miedo o el odio. Sostiene que la razón puede controlar las emociones. La razón es la virtud y, la virtud es el amor hacia Dios. Cuanto más amamos a Dios, tanto más somos capaces de controlar las emociones. Cuanto mejor control de nuestras emociones, mejor podemos comprender a Dios. Para él, la más activa es el alma, cuanto más se conoce adecuadamente Dios. La más pasiva es el alma, la menos adecuada que conoce a Dios. La más activa es el alma, es más capaz de evitar las emociones que son malas. La más pasiva es el alma, más se acepta a las emociones son malas. Aquí parece que Spinoza defiende un determinado tipo de ascetismo, pero sin considerar el cuerpo como un mal o un objeto que debe ser disciplinado o para ser sometido. Son las emociones  o los afectos que deben ser  controlados. Sin embargo, si analizamos bien su tesis, podemos concluir que Spinoza pertenece a la larga tradición que se remonta a los estoicos y, finalmente, a Sócrates, quien considera el conocimiento como un cierto tipo de libertad. Su tesis es muy parecida a Epitecto , un estoico que hizo hincapié en que "el campo más importante y urgente en especial de estudio es el que tiene que ver con las emociones fuertes ... penas, lamentos, envidias ... las pasiones que hacen que sea imposible para nosotros, incluso para escuchar a la razón."  También para Spinoza, el conocimiento es libertad, y todo lo que impide la adquisición o el logro del conocimiento es malo. Escribe él: “Un afecto es sólo malo o nocivo en cuanto que impide que el alma pueda pensar… puesto que la esencia del alma, es decir, su potencia consiste en el solo pensamiento” ( Prop. IX, demostración ). 

Mt. Pinatubo Crater Lake, Zambales, Philippines

¿Qué impide el alma para alcanzar su esencia? Spinoza responde que se trata de los malos afectos o las pasiones como la denomina. Pero lo que no explica es donde vienen estos malos afectos. Según él, “Un afecto que es una pasión es una idea confusa” ( Prop. III, demostración), y “…deja de ser pasión tan pronto como nos formamos de él una idea clara y distinta” ” ( Prop. III ).  Pero, no apunta al cuerpo como la fuente de estos malos afectos o las pasiones, sino lo contrario: “…no hay afección alguna del cuerpo de la que no podamos formar un concepto claro y distinto,” y añade más, “Pues un afecto es la idea de una afección del cuerpo y, por ello debe implicar un concepto claro y distinto ( Prop. IV ). Si los buenos afectos son los que brotan de la razón, entonces, ¿de dónde salen o vienen  los malos afectos?  Así como lo explica, “Los afectos de la razón o que son suscitados por ella, si se toma en consideración el tiempo, son más potentes que los que se refieren a cosas singulares consideradas como ausentes.  No consideramos una cosa como ausente por obra del afecto con el que la imaginamos, sino en virtud del hecho de que el cuerpo experimenta otro afecto que la existencia de dicha cosa” ( Prop. VII ). Pero no tenemos una respuesta clara. Aparte de esta cuestión pendiente, tenemos también la duda sobre cómo Spinoza va a reconciliar la existencia del bien con la existencia del mal, o la verdad con la falsedad. Si Dios es la única sustancia e infinita, ¿cómo puede existir el mal? Si Dios es perfecto, ¿por qué hay  afectos nocivos, sufrimientos o pasiones? Si Dios es eterno, ¿por qué el cuerpo perece? Spinoza nos respuesta que el error y la falsedad vienen del conocimiento inadecuado de Dios. Y ¿Por qué Dios permite que esto suceda? Según él, el conocimiento del mal viene de las ideas inadecuadas, es decir, ideas que no se refieren a Dios adecuadamente. Pero también sostiene que todas las ideas se encuentran en Dios. Por lo tanto, nos preguntamos, ¿Por qué Dios permite a las ideas malas infiltrarse en sí mismo?

Lake Maughan, South Cotabato, Philippines

Otro aspecto que tenemos dudas es de la eternidad del alma que se elabora en la Proposición XXIII. Spinoza enuncia su doctrina del alma humana como ser en el sentido de un mortal, es decir, en la medida en que se une con el cuerpo algo que perece con el cuerpo, pero en otro sentido tener una especie de inmortalidad, es decir, en la medida en que es parte de la causa de la existencia del alma, es decir, Dios (o la Naturaleza), se debe, al igual que la totalidad de todo, sigue siendo inmutable e inmortal. La posición de Spinoza de que el alma debe sobrevivir por sí mismo cuando la vida del cuerpo ha terminado es una suposición ininteligible. Esto sugeriría que el alma es un individuo o una sustancia casi, es decir, más o menos independiente del cuerpo, en lugar de un aspecto distinguible de la actividad de un individuo, que es una persona. Esto parece ser una violación de la su misma contención anti-dualista de que el alma y el cuerpo son una y la misma cosa concebida bajo dos atributos diferentes. La esencia del cuerpo es eterna, según él mismo, ya que se basa en la esencia intemporal de Dios. Pero no podemos evitar a preguntar estas: cuando el cuerpo muere, ¿qué modo de extensión corresponde ahora al alma eterna que es ya inmortal? Spinoza responde que, mientras que el modo de extensión que es el cuerpo humano condicionado por el tiempo y el espacio perece, queda la esencia del cuerpo que se concibe bajo una forma de eternidad (sub specie aeternitatis) (Prop. XXII ). Al mismo tiempo, la parte sensible e imaginativa del alma perece con el cuerpo real. Entonces, la conclusión sería que el cuerpo y el alma son, en parte mortal y,  en parte inmortal.  ¿Esto sería posible?  Entonces, Spinoza contradice a sí mismo 

Lake Mainit, Surigao del Norte, Philippines

El otro problema es si el alma sobrevive a la destrucción del cuerpo, por lo tanto, debe haber otro tipo de existencia. Este tipo de existencia que debe ser diferente de la vida ordinaria con sus destinos temporales. Sin embargo, esta suposición estaría en contradicción con su propia creencia de que Dios es uno, o Dios lo es todo. Ya que para él, la esencia de un cuerpo como un modo extendido es en Dios bajo el atributo de extensión (sub specie aeternitatis)  ( Prop. XXII ). ¿Esto significaría que Dios es eterno y al mismo tiempo perece o que se somete a la muerte?

Lake Danao, Cebu ( Camotes Islands ), Philippines

Según unos comentarios, la eternidad de la mens que habla aquí Spinoza no es una infinita duración o como tal se concibe en las religiones tradicionales.  La eternidad que habla aquí Spinoza  es una especie de transición de algo temporal, una existencia sin fin continúa en algo atemporal e intrínseca. Pero su tesis es: Deus sive Natura y Dios es eternal. Pero hay algo de la natura que perece. Por lo tanto, para él, la eternidad sería volver a la nada. Es similar al nirvana en el budismo. La eternidad es el no tiempo, la nada. Con esta idea, podemos calificar a Spinoza como un ateo. 

CONCLUSIÓN

Hinatuan Enchanted River, Surigao del Sur, Philippines

La ética es una rama de la filosofía que se ocupa de la moralidad de los actos humanos. Se profundiza en los conceptos como el bien y el mal, lo correcto y lo incorrecto, lícitas e ilícitas, la virtud y el vicio. Sólo podemos hablar de un acto moral o inmoral, cuando un ser humano es libre, es decir, su razón y la voluntad están libres de obstáculos. Pero la pregunta es, ¿podemos tener una ética si todo, incluso los seres humanos, es parte de la naturaleza que se considera como Dios?

Lake Taal, Batangas, Philippines

Spinoza entendió bien y el mal como conceptos relativos, afirmando que no hay nada intrínsecamente bueno o malo, excepto en relación con un individuo en particular. Cosas que habían sido clásicamente considerado como bueno o malo, Spinoza argumentó, eran simplemente buenas o malas para los humanos. Entonces, podemos calificar a Spinoza como un precursor del relativismo. Además, Spinoza cree en un universo determinista en el que "todas las cosas en la naturaleza proceden de cierta (definida ) necesidad y con la máxima perfección."  Entonces, ¿podemos tener una ética si todas las cosas, incluso los seres humanos, están determinadas por necesidad, si no hay libertad?

Según Schopenhauer que la doctrina ética de Spinoza se puede valorar en esta:  'El mundo se debe a que es, y es como es porque es así. ... Sin embargo, la deificación del mundo ... no admite ninguna ética verdadera y, además, estaba en flagrante contradicción con los males físicos y la maldad moral de este mundo. " Entonces, podemos concluir que Baruch Spinoza elabora una doctrina de ética sin ética .

Baruch Spinoza

                                    

ARISTOTLE’S ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ

Amanpulo, Palawan, Philippines

It is difficult indeed to make conclusions if one does not have a clear basis from which to conclude, just like in the case of the epistemology of Aristotle or how Aristotle understood episteme. There have been a lot of interpretations regarding this matter. The Greek philosopher did not leave any particular work that deals especially with this, as C.C.W.  Taylor confirmed: “In contrast with Plato, none of Aristotle’s major works has its central topic the nature of knowledge in general.”[1] In Posterior Analytics we may find some discussions about this topic of knowledge, but here Aristotle drew a number of distinctions and the liberal use of terms that spur debates until the present day.

I.             ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ: A SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE?

Caramoan, Camarines Sur, Philippines

What is ἐπιστήμη to Aristotle? Among the modern commentators of Aristotle, many understand it as “scientific knowledge” while others, like Burnyeat, consider it as some special cognitive state or “understanding” as opposed to a simple knowledge.  What is the difference between “scientific knowledge” and “understanding” then? The Greek term ἐπιστήμη which Aristotle himself was analyzing, according to Burnyeat, can refer either to the cognitive state of the knowing person or to a body of knowledge or  a science- a system of propositions which can be learned and known.[2] Many Aristotelian commentators, like Taylor, translate this term as “scientific knowledge.” Scientific knowledge is a knowledge accumulated by systematic study and organized by general principles. It is usually attained by demonstration. Biology, for example, is a scientific knowledge or science about the living things especially with reference to their origin, growth, reproduction, structure, and behavior. It may answer questions like: Why do horses sleep standing up? The acquisition of knowledge in this discipline is through experiments and demonstrations. It does not explain though why they have life, which is the common principle among living matters. Burnyeat, however, refuted the traditional English translation of Aristotelian episteme as “scientific knowledge”. According to him, the results this produces can be ambiguous and puzzling.[3] And we will know why. And he also emphasizes that there is no Greek word or term that corresponds to the modern term “scientific”. By scientific we mean “systematic or accurate in manner”.  For his part, Taylor refuses to translate the Greek terms sophia and nous as ‘wisdom’ and ‘intelligence’ respectively because, according to him, this would be uninformative, or even worse, misleading. But he does not hesitate to translate episteme as scientific knowledge. Burnyeat, as we know, questions this translation.

Unmnamed islet, Cebu, Philippines

Burnyeat argues that “Aristotle first advances a quite general thesis about a cognitive state” which the Greek thinker himself calls ἐπἰστασϑαι, that “in its unqualified version this involves knowing the cause or explanation of something and knowing its necessity”, and that from this “one can have ἐπιστήμη of is that which cannot be otherwise.”[4] Burnyeat distinguishes ἐπἰστασϑαι from ἐπιστήμη. Burnyeat speaks of two phases or modes of the cognitive state which are distinct but complementary.  This will help to clarify the issue. Burnyeat, moreover, assures that Aristotle gives the main characteristic of the cognitive state: “it centrally involves the possession of apodeictic proof or demonstration.”[5] By apodeictic we mean that is unquestionably or necessarily true. It means that the cognitive state possesses what is necessarily true. 

Bellaroca, Marinduque, Philippines

He criticizes G.R.G. Mure’s translation (“the premises of demonstrated knowledge”) for he believes that a cognitive state cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises. He says that “these attributes belong to knowledge in the other sense of what is known,” and he further clarifies, “to the propositions making up the body of science.”[6] We may understand Burnyeat’s argument in this simple logic: If we suppose that ἐπἰστασϑαι is a cognitive state, but a cognitive state cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises, therefore the ἐπἰστασϑαι cannot be demonstrated nor it has premises. In other words, if we accept this thesis of Burnyeat (“A cognitive state cannot be said to be demonstrated, nor does it have premises”), therefore the cognitive state denotes a knowledge that is evident, necessary, and universal. Burnyeat’s argument, we believe, is very much in line with Aristotle’s idea that there is no distinction between what one perceives and what is being perceived. The ἐπἰστασϑαι could consequently  mean the act of knowing itself or the sensory experience that gives us direct and immediate knowledge of the objects while episteme is a kind of special cognitive state.

Dimakya, Palawan, Philippines

What is evident and necessary does not need any demonstration because a demonstration is given in order to clarify things. By demonstration we mean an act or circumstance of proving or being proved conclusively as by reasoning or a show of evidence. What is evident is clear in itself and does not need any instrument to represent, to explain, or to prove itself. We say that scientific knowledge is acquired through demonstration since we need proofs or even empirical experiments like in the case of experimental sciences. Scientific knowledge then does not delve on what is evident but tries to impart information through proofs or demonstrations. Through this, we may understand why Burnyeat says that demonstration and premises belong to a body of science. We have that common knowledge, for example, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. This knowledge is evident. It does not need any demonstration. It becomes a scientific knowledge when we try to explain why this phenomenon happens or occurs. For this we have a scientific knowledge or a science about the heavenly objects, the astronomy. He continues explaining, “The things which are true, primary, etc. are indeed expressed as the premises of demonstration, but the dependence in question here is the epistemological relation of the cognitive state to its grounds, not the logical relation of conclusion to premises.” [7] What he means here is that what is true or necessary is evidence or proof in itself. Therefore, the thesis of Taylor: “There is no episteme of the principles of knowledge” is correct or true if episteme here refers to scientific knowledge.  

Hundred Islands, Pangasinan, Philippines

Aristotle opines: “All instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.”[8] If knowledge is demonstrative then the premises prior to it are known than it. It means that the premises are themselves primary, immediate, and prior to. Burnyeat, thus, asserts: “Demonstrative ἐπιστήμη depends on things which are true, primary, immediate, better known than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion.”[9] We are quite sure then that Aristotle’s “pre-existent” knowledge does not mean scientific knowledge. That “pre-existent” knowledge of Aristotle could not be demonstrated. If it could be demonstrated, then there is another “pre-existent” knowledge prior to it, and so on and so forth. We will end up in a vicious cycle. Thus, if all knowledge is demonstrative, then there is no knowledge per se. If all knowledge needs proof or evidence, then that proof or evidence is some kind of possession of knowledge or, we say, a “prior” knowledge. We do agree with Burnyeat’s conclusion: “Because ἐπιστήμη involves grasping the demonstration of necessary conclusions, it is grounded epistemologically on the premises of that demonstration.”[10] We, therefore, assert that not all knowledge is demonstrative.

Sunken Cemetery, Camiguin, Philippines

Taylor, on the other hand, asserts that episteme is a demonstrative state. By this he means that a human being knows when he believes something and the principles or the premises are known or presented to him. Citing the Nicomachean Ethics, he states that “what is grasped by episteme is what is demonstrated, and since there have to be first principles of demonstration, there is no episteme of the principles of knowledge.[11] To prove that there is no knowledge or episteme of the principles of knowledge, Taylor explains  that the principles of demonstration cannot be themselves demonstrated  because if ever there is this possibility, then the principles of demonstration must be known and must be known other than by demonstration. The inconsistency of Taylor is this: if we acquire episteme by demonstration, then we must know beforehand the premises or principles of that demonstration. If we say that knowledge is acquired through reasoning, then there must be a demonstration, but the premises themselves are conclusions of the demonstration. Therefore not all knowledge is demonstrative. We can conclude then that not all episteme is scientific. 

Tawi-Tawi, Philippines

Moreover, Taylor identifies episteme as one of the theoretical cognitive states together with the sophia. He states that theoretical knowledge is restricted to knowledge of the universal necessary truths, but later says that demonstrative knowledge (episteme) is restricted to what we can explain. But universal necessary truths do not need any explanation. What is universal and necessary is proof in itself. In the other part, he says that “… episteme, phronesis, sophia, and nous are described as ‘those in which we possess the truth and are never mistaken.”[12]  It is indeed true that there can be no error in knowledge of what is evident. The knowledge of what is evident can never commit any error, since the evidence is the truth itself. Errors or mistakes could occur in the demonstration. So it would be a mistake to translate episteme as scientific knowledge if this latter denotes explanation or show of evidence. Scientific knowledge, though tries to be systematic and accurate, is still prone to error or mistake. Biology, Chemistry, and other sciences do not necessarily impart truth.  The principles of these sciences are justified through results of experiments which are prone to mistake or error, therefore, changeable and contingent.

Bucas Grande, Surigao del Sur, Philippines

In the other part of his work, Taylor states this: “Aristotle contrasts episteme properly so called (i.e. scientific knowledge) with perceptual episteme.”[13] But he insists that only ‘explanatory’ knowledge ( i.e. scientific knowledge ) of a phenomenon, that is, knowing in the full sense why that phenomenon occurs, is worthy to be called episteme, or in his own words, “dignified by the term episteme”[14] He admits that explanatory knowledge presupposes a prior knowledge, “knowledge that it occurs.” He believes, however, that this kind of knowledge is incomplete. Its completion comes only when one has an explanation of the phenomenon. To qualify this acquisition as knowledge, one must know the explanation of this phenomenon. For him, only when we come to understand through explanation that we can have a complete knowledge that is worthy to be called episteme. Taylor, however, forgets that this kind of knowledge is “perfect” in itself since it is indubitable and certain. It is a knowledge of what is evident and true.

We oppose Taylor’s thesis- ‘explanatory’ knowledge (scientific knowledge) is the ‘true’ knowledge- because this knowledge could not be knowledge at all since it is prone to error or mistake. In order to be a true knowledge, it must be assured of foregone conclusion, which the scientific knowledge may not have. We believe that knowledge consists in knowing being or truth since it is impossible to know what is not.

II.          ΕΠΙΣΤΕΜΕ AS UNDERSTANDING

Boracay, Aklan, Philippines

If ἐπιστήμηis not scientific knowledge, what does Aristotle mean of it? Can we simply call it “knowledge”? Burnyeat believes that for Aristotle, episteme is not knowledge as understood in philosophy. What is episteme then? He thinks that Aristotle’s episteme is best understood as “understanding.” One could understand a thing or fact if that thing or fact is explained. For example, it is a common knowledge that it is day when the sun appears, and it is night when the sun disappears and darkness reigns. Even a young child knows this, but when this phenomenon is explained to him, he may acquire a “deeper” knowledge, not just a “mere” or “immediate” knowledge. Since there is no exact term that could capture or embody this kind of knowledge in English language, Burnyeat prefers to use the term ‘understanding’. 

Coron, Palawan, Philippines

What would be the consequences if we translate episteme as understanding, not as scientific knowledge? Knowledge is generally understood today as justified true belief.  According to Burnyeat, “justification is expressed in argument to show that a proposition is true.”[15] He further adds that the argument needs not to be deductive. If ever it is deductive, he continues, it is not even a requirement for Aristotle in order to explain from first principles why the proposition is true.[16] This means that the demonstration from the first principles is not a requirement of justification but of scientific explanation. From this, Burnyeat deduces that “explanation and understanding go together in a way that explanation and knowledge do not.”[17] According to him, he does not want to provoke controversy with this remark. But with a deeper analysis of his argument, this is somewhat true. There is no need to explain a fact if the other knows it, but there is a need to explain so that that other could understand. John Barnes translates a part of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics this way: “We think we understand a thing simpliciter ( and not in the sophistic fashion incidentally) whenever we think we are aware both that the explanation because of which the object is is its explanation, and that it is not possible for this to be otherwise.”[18] Understanding, therefore, depends on explanation (not the way Taylor understands it). What we receive and gain from knowledge is understanding. Using the analogy of teaching, Burnyeat clearly explains, “Teaching in the sense of imparting knowledge to people who did not have it before must normally include citing of evidence and justification.”[19] Citing evidence and justification denotes explanation. He adds, “But teaching may also be designed to impart understanding of knowledge which the pupils already have, or a deeper understanding of a science which they already have some acquaintance with but in an unsystematic way.”[20] Episteme, then, as understanding denotes a possession of knowledge or grasping the demonstration of necessary conclusions.

III.       CONCLUSION

Miniloc, Palawan, Philippines

The issue about the notion of ἐπιστήμη in Aristotle remains to be open for debate. There are different translations and interpretations of Aristotle’s texts. We beg to disagree, however, with the translation of episteme as scientific knowledge or simply as knowledge. If episteme indicates the end or completion of the epistemological process, as Burnyeat concludes,[21] then it could not be scientific knowledge. Moreover, it is absurd to say “one knows what he knows”, rather we say “one understands what he knows”. The term ἐπιστήμη then could not be simply called “knowledge”. If episteme denotes achievement or possession of its end (knowledge), the term ‘understanding’ would be the appropriate word in English as equivalent to Aristotle’s ἐπιστήμη. Since there is no knowledge about knowledge, what we could have is the understanding of that knowledge, that is, having or possessing a “deeper” knowledge. We do agree, then, with Burnyeat that Aristotle´s ἐπιστήμη means “understanding”.

Aristotle

                                            

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[1] C.C.W. Taylor, Aristotle’s Epistemology, p.116

[2] M.F. Burnyeat, Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, p.97

[3] Op. cit.

[4] Op. cit. p.98

[5] Op.  cit.

[6] Op. cit. p.99

[7] Op. cit. p. 99

[8] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.1

[9] Op. cit.

[10] Burnyeat, p. 99

[11] C.C.W. Taylor, Aristotle’s Epistemology, p.119

[12] Op. cit., p.118

[13] Op. Cit., p.118

[14] Taylor, p.122

[15] Burnyeat, p. 101

[16] Op. cit.

[17] Op. cit. p. 102

[18] Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Oxford 1975.

[19] Burnyeat, p. 117

[20] Op. cit., pp. 117, 118

[21] Op. cit., p.133

A REVIEW OF SÖREN KIERKEGAARD’S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS OR A FRAGMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

El Nido, Palawan, Philippines

What best defines man? We are used to the Aristotelian definition of man as a rational being. Does rationality totally capture the essence of man? It is true that what separates and distinguishes us from the other terrestrial creatures is our rationality. But why is it that man sometimes acts irrationally or lives like a beast? Rationality expresses a truth about the human being, but it does not totally encompass the true nature of man or exhaust it. Furthermore, Aristotle sustained that all men by nature desire to know.[1] Knowledge is a characteristic proper to man. Man is the only animal capable of knowledge of the first principles and the ultimate causes of beings. But why is it even the so-called wise men cannot find or accept the truth? So many human beings are wise but they do not live like true men. This is the paradox of man. Man is a paradox. It is difficult to understand or know who man is from mere earthly perspectives. It may be apt to define man as someone who searches for the truth. Rationality is incomprehensible if it does not have truth as the aim of its activity. Wisdom or knowledge is nonsense if it does not have truth as its goal. Man is a searcher of truth. But what is truth? How can man achieve or arrive at truth? 

Mactan Island, Cebu, Philippines

These are the questions that the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard wanted to answer in his seminal work Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy. However, he was not interested with the finite truth. He did not seek for the truth of the philosophers. What he wanted to know and arrive at is the Eternal Truth that philosophy could not achieve to acquire. So it is understandable that he used Christian vocabulary in his method in order to arrive at truth. But for him, the knowledge of truth and its subsequent acquisition is subjective, not objective. The way or method to the knowledge of truth does not employ the usual philosophical arguments because it involves with a leap. 

Calanggaman Island, Leyte, Philippines

How far does the Truth admit of being learned? He began his exposition with this question. The Truth is something necessary that man could not evade or ignore. Thus, he stated: “In so far as the Truth is conceived as something to be learned, its non-existence is evidently presupposed, so that in proposing to learn it one makes it the object of inquiry” (ch.1, 1). The Truth is the object of man’s learning. How do we learn or acquire knowledge of it? This is where he was interested with. But the acquisition of knowledge is itself a paradox: “One cannot seek for what he knows, and it seems equally impossible for him to seek for what he does not know. For what a man knows he cannot seek, since he knows it; and what he does not know he cannot seek, since he does not even know for what to seek” (ch.1, 1). Therefore Truth is not an object of search. Searching thus is an absurdity. But how can we arrive at the Truth if there is no need to search? We understand learning as acquisition of knowledge for we do not have a previous knowledge, like a child who does not have a previous knowledge of what numbers are before studying arithmetic. But for Kierkegaard, learning is not acquisition or search for the Truth. For him, learning is recollection: “One who is ignorant needs only a reminder to help him come to himself in the consciousness of what he knows” (ch.1, 1).

Sta. Cruz Island, Zamboanga City, Philippines

Aristotle opined that our mind is a tabula rasa prior to the acquisition of any knowledge. It means that we do not have innate ideas. But in Phaedo, Plato used recollection to prove the immortality of the soul, thus knowledge for him comes subjectively. It is in this Platonic thinking that Kierkegaard based his epistemology. Thus for the Danish philosopher, the knowledge of the Truth does not come from outside sources, nor to be sought outside of man for according to him, “the Truth is not introduced into the individual from without, but was within him” (ch.1, 1). All what man has to do is to remember, to recollect.  Man has already the truth implanted in him since his birth or existence. The presence of truth is innate in man. “My relation to Socrates or Prodicus cannot concern me with respect to my eternal happiness, for this is given me retrogressively through my possession of the Truth, which I had from the beginning without knowing it”(ch.1, 3). In short, man has an innate knowledge. This defines the epistemology of Kierkegaard. 

Samal Island, Davao del Norte, Philippines

But why does man err? Why is he lost? Why do men dispute each other? Kierkegaard pointed out ignorance as the culprit. In his ignorance, man veers away from the truth. But ignorance could not be accountable to God. “In so far as the learner exists he is already created, and hence God must have endowed him with the condition for understanding the Truth. For otherwise his earlier existence must have been merely brutish”(ch.1, 4). Rather ignorance of the Truth owes to one’s fault. It is man’s own deliberative action. Man wills to be in the state of Error (sin). Since he is in the state of Error, man could not remember anymore the Truth. 

Unnamed & uninhabited islands, Sulu, Philippines

In this epistemological explanation of Kierkegaard about truth and ignorance, we can draw out also his anthropological point of view. John Paul II defined man as a searcher of the Truth.[2] Man is incomprehensible without the Truth. Man is totally doomed without the Truth. Precisely the abuses committed against man are perpetrated out of simple ignorance or willful rejection of the true dignity of man. In the same way for Kierkegaard, man is incomprehensible without the Truth, since he was created with the Truth embedded in his very nature. Without it, man could not be man. But the act of searching signifies that the Truth is not within himself, but rather outside. What the encyclical tries to convey is that man could not be the arbiter of truth. If man is the arbiter of truth, then Truth is relative. Rather, due to sin, man has lost his connection with the Truth though not totally. Man is endowed with intelligence and will, faculties that were not lost, that will help him reconnect with the Truth. Thus even Aristotle affirmed this when he began his work Metaphysics with the phrase: All men by nature want to know. In Kierkegaard, however, man does not need to search for the Truth for it is within him: “For the Truth in which I rest was within me, and came to light through myself” (ch.1, 3). A seeker is someone who does not have the possession of what he seeks for or what he lacks. Thus he seeks it for he needs it. The very act of searching implies the absence of the object. But for Kierkegaard, the Truth is not absolutely absent in man. He thus stated: “The seeker must be destitute of the Truth up to the very moment of his learning it” (ch.1, 3). Man could not be therefore described or considered as a seeker. 

Apo Island, Palawan, Philippines

Who is man for Kierkegaard then? Man thus for him is a holder or bearer of Truth. He averred: “Since it appears that at the bottom every human being is in possession of the Truth” (ch.1, 3). Kierkegaard however did not say that man is the owner of the Truth for it would contradict his whole stance. Why then man needs to learn or re-learn the Truth if he has it in his possession ever since? Ignoring the truth or departing from it, that is, willfully rejecting it is what leads man to the state of Error. Ignoring the truth is not the same as ignorance of the Truth. In the act of ignoring, one is conscious of his act. It is a deliberative act. Thus Kierkegaard stated: “For my own Error is something I can discover only by myself, since it is only when I have discovered it that it is discovered, even if the whole world knew of it before” (ch.1, 4). The greatest problem of man, the “learner”, is that he is in the state of Error and he is not aware of his own ignorance of his error. It means that man is ignorant of his ignoring the Truth. And man cannot redeem himself from his own error. He needs someone to remind him that he is in the state of Error. It seems that Kierkegaard had criticized his contemporary philosophers for complicating and debasing the Truth with their absurd philosophies. 

Caramoan, Camarines Sur, Philippines

Here, Kierkegaard appealed to a figure of the Teacher. No learner could take himself out from the state of Error unless someone will remind him of his miserable condition. But no one could be a teacher to himself since he could not teach what he is ignorant of. The role of the teacher, according to Kierkegaard, is to remind the learner that he is in the state of Error, not precisely to take him out from that state: “The teacher is merely an occasion whoever he may be, even if he is a God” (ch.1, 4). It seems that the Teacher has a passive role. It is understandable because Kierkegaard wanted to be coherent with his epistemology in line with Plato: that man knows already everything and that the task of the teacher is to draw it out. But Kierkegaard went beyond this Platonic thinking because for him, the problem is that man must find the Teacher who will remind him of his error and provide him the means to know again the Truth. Unlike Plato however, Kierkegaard believed that no mere man could take up the role of the Teacher because the Teacher does not only give the learner the requisite condition, but the Teacher himself is the Truth (cf. ch.1, 5): “The Teacher is then God himself, who in acting as an occasion prompts the learner to recall that he is in Error.” This Teacher is also the original creator of his human nature who gave him the Truth and with it the condition (cf. ch.1, 4). 

Siargao Islands, Surigao del Norte, Philippines

However since God is the Unknown, He could not be a Teacher to man since God is totally different from him, therefore God could not make himself be understood by man. He asked: “What then is the Unknown?” And then he answered it immediately: “It is the limit to which the Reason repeatedly comes…, it is the absolutely different. But because it is absolutely different, there is no mark by which it could be distinguished”(cf. ch.3, 5). He maintained that Reason can never obtain the knowledge of the Unknown. Reason could never understand God, “for if God is absolutely unlike man, then man is absolutely unlike the God; but how could the Reason be expected to understand this?” (ch.3, 6) This is an indication of the aversion of Kierkegaard to natural theology or theodicy. This is also a denunciation of the German Idealists’ pantheism and idealism. Kierkegaard might also have Hegel in mind, denouncing his rationalization of God and of the Christian mysteries. For him, we cannot prove the existence of God by mere Reason: “The paradoxical passion of the Reason thus comes repeatedly into collision with this Unknown, which does indeed exist, but is unknown, and in so far does not exist. The Reason cannot advance beyond this point, and yet it cannot refrain in its paradoxicalness from arriving at this limit and occupying itself therewith” (ch.3, 4). Kierkegaard believed that God’s existence does not need any proof: “His existence does indeed explain his deeds, but the deeds do not prove his existence” (ch.3, 3). 

Sohuton Lagoons, Surigao del Norte, Philippines

To the question how can God be the Teacher to man, thus Kierkegaard answered, “in order to be man’s Teacher, (the) God proposed to make himself like the individual man, so that he (man) might fully understand him (God/ Truth)” (ch.3, 6). And for Kierkegaard, this is the Absolute Paradox. Christian doctrine is full of paradoxical tenets: Jesus Christ as true God and true man; life after death; manifestation of love through death. The Absolute Paradox will forever remain a headache to Reason. Reason could never reconcile with it. Thus Kierkegaard mentioned another form of knowledge that could transcend the boundaries that limit Reason: Faith. For him, only the knowledge of Faith could understand the Absolute Paradox. Only through faith that man could re-learn the truth.

Hamilo Coast, Bataan, Philippines

Here Kierkegaard transports us from a philosophical epistemology to theological epistemology. He believed that since God/ Truth/ the Unknown is beyond our comprehension, this Truth appears to us in the form of a paradox. Reason could never understand contradictions though a paradox itself is not a contradiction. But for reason, it is a contradiction. Only Faith could reconcile “contradictions”. In the thought of Kierkegaard, the object of Faith is the Paradox. Thus he insisted: “No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the Eternal is the historical” (ch.4, 5). This Paradox incites offense in the non-believer because he cannot understand what he tries to understand. Since reason cannot transcend itself or go beyond its limit, thus it considers everything beyond its scope as absurdity. With the image of the French Revolution fresh in his mind, Kierkegaard seemed to criticize those who exalt the primacy of reason and retorted with an argument that it is the Paradox that makes Reason absurd: “Since the Paradox has made the Reason absurd, the regard of the Reason is no reliable criterion” (ch.3, 9). 

With this declaration of the defeat of the Reason by the Paradox, Kierkegaard emphasized that the only way to approach the Paradox is through Faith. Any way or type of knowledge is ridiculous. Thus only the knowledge through Faith that one can know or grasp the Paradox since by its nature it is unreachable by rational knowledge. Here we can detect the influence of Fideism or the Lutheran tenet sola fide in Kierkegaard.

Camiguin, Philippines

With the status of Faith well in placed, Kierkegaard, this time, equated Faith or belief with new existence, alluding to the Christian doctrine of faith as new birth or a rebirth. Thus he stated: “Belief is a sense for coming into existence” (Interlude, 8). And here we detect the transcendental existentialism in Kierkegaard: “For belief and coming into existence correspond to one another, and are concerned with the two negative determinations of being, namely the past and the future, and with the present in so far as it is conceived from the point of view of a negative determination of being, namely as having come into existence” (Interlude, 9). Faith has always the ever present as its time. Kierkegaard concluded: “For Faith does not have to do with essence, but with being [historical existence], and the assumption that the God determines him eternally and not historically (Interlude, 10). 

Boracay Island, Aklan, Philippines

There is also an influence of Hegel in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard distanced himself from the Platonic belief that the individual has an existence prior to his coming into being, thus his nature is determined in continuity with itself. Instead, he aligned himself with Hegel with this statement: “But in our project, on the contrary, everything is forward-looking and historical, so that the notion of being born with faith is as plausible as the notion of being born twenty-four years old” (ch.5, 5). Kierkegaard followed Hegel’s historicism but with his unique characteristic, paradoxical. We may call it transcendental historicism. Kierkegaard considered faith as a birth within a birth (ch.5, 6). It is through faith that man transcends history as he is born again, but he remains at the same time historical, a product of his time. Thus he stated: “The absolute fact is an historical fact, and as such it is the object of Faith (ch.5, 7). A person with faith is always a contemporary whether he was born 1500 years ago or 15 years ago.

CONCLUSION

Kierkegaard was a product of his time. He was influenced by his Idealist precursors and contemporaries, but at the same, he tried to break free from being associated with them. He distinguished himself from the predominantly pantheistic and atheistic atmosphere of his time. Kierkegaard wanted to know the truth of human existence, but for him it could not be totally answered by purely human reasoning. His work can also be considered as a reaction against Hegel’s intention to demystify the Christian revelation and eventually, rationalize the Christian faith. Kierkegaard subtly criticized the philosophers and historians who tried to prove Christianity through empty reasoning. Thus for Kierkegaard, there are only two choices: either believe or be offended.

Sören Kierkegaard

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[1] Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 1.

[2] John Paul II, Fides et Ratio, nos. 28, 31, & 33.